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British political values, attitudes to climate change, and travel 
behaviour 
ABSTRACT 
The UK is committed to a sharp reduction of greenhouse gases. Progress towards its goal will 
depend on whether the public can be persuaded to change their travel behaviour. Using British 
Social Attitudes 2011 survey data, analyses show that the majority of adults ± especially the 
young and better-educated ± believe that climate change is occurring but even concerned 
believers appear reluctant to modify their behaviour. Policies designed to alter transport habits 
and induce behaviour change need to take that clear conclusion into account.  Without a strong 
political commitment, substantial change that will significantly mitigate the processes and 
impact of climate change now appears less likely. 
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Introduction 
 
The UK is committed to a sharp reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG). The emphasis is on 
market-based policies to achieve that goal but progress will also depend heavily on public 
commitment and the extent to which concerned citizens can be persuaded to change or modify 
their behaviour and make personal travel choices that are less environmentally damaging. 
Drawing on data from the module on climate change beliefs in the 2011 British Social Attitudes 
survey (BSA: Park et al., 2012), we examine attitudes towards anthropogenic climate change 
in the British population and the propensity for individual behavioural changes according to 
socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity and educational attainment, 
plus political values and party identification.  In general, the young and the better-educated are 
both more aware of, and more prepared to accept policies designed to mitigate climate change, 
but individual behavioural adaptation to that end is only likely to occur on a wide scale if it is 
UHTXLUHGWKURXJKSROLWLFDODFWLRQVXSSRUWIRUVXFKDFWLRQGHSHQGVRQSHRSOH¶VSROLWLFDOYDOXHV
hence the need to study beliefs about climate change and travel behaviour within that context. 
Social and Political Context 
The UK government¶s commitment to a sharp reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) set out in 
The Climate Change Act 2008 requires a reduction in emissions by at least 34 per cent from 
their 1990 levels by 2020, and 80 per cent by 2050. The main mechanism to achieve this will 
be the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), alongside a range of mandated market policies 
designed to encourage energy suppliers to move to renewables and to improve carbon 
efficiency. Progress will also depend heavily on public opinion and willingness to change 
behaviour and make choices, including choices about transport and travel that are less 
environmentally damaging (Giddens, 2011). 
The level of greenhouse gases entering the atmosphere is steadily rising and currently there is 
no known way of removing them, hence the policy emphasis on substantially reducing 
emission levels. Carbon dioxide (CO2, measured in tons per capita) is the most significant 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas and the largest single cause of climate change. It is estimated 
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that transport alone is responsible for roughly a quarter of all UK CO2 emissions, making it 
the second biggest contributor to GHG in the UK after energy production (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, 2012), and is among the fastest-growing sources (Banister et al., 
2012; Chapman, 2007). At the household level, travel accounts for about one-fifth of total CO2 
emissions and it is estimated that British citizens, on average, emit over 3 tons of CO2 each 
year as a result of their travel behaviour. The total annual average carbon footprint (including 
direct and indirect embodied emissions) was estimated as close to 17 tons per person, with the 
atmospheric lifetime of CO2 between 5 and 200 years according to the IPCC (2001). Reports 
of CO2 lifetime averages of 100 years are typical (Houghton, 2009), so with the rapid 
accumulation of those gases in the atmosphere there is the real risk of a runaway greenhouse 
effect as a result of human-created global warming. 
TKHRYHUZKHOPLQJPDMRULW\RIFOLPDWHVFLHQWLVWVDQGWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJVFLHQWLILFERGLHVDJUHH
that anthropogenically-induced climate change is a significant threat to the planet and the 
human way of life (as illustrated by the Fifth Assessment Reports of the UN Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change: IPCC, 2014). This global environmental problem is contested in the 
political arena and wider society, however. Some doubtful Conservative politicians and 
sceptical commentators in the (conservative) British media have attacked climate change 
science and sought to undermine the case for climate policy-making (Dunlap and McCright, 
2013: on the media and climate change more generally see Painter, 2013, and Boykoff and 
Smith, 2010). ThosHµVFHSWLFV¶KDYHYDULRXVO\DUJXHGeither that anthropogenic climate change 
is scientifically unproven, and/or that the threat posed is exaggerated, and/or even ± if it does 
exist ± that little can be done to avert its predicted consequences (Lawson, 2009); recent survey 
evidence suggests that the British (and American, Leiserowitz et al., 2013) public ± for whom, 
according to Giddens (2011), the significance of climate change is too abstract to grasp ± are 
becoming more sceptical about climate change and concern about global warming is in decline 
(Humphrey and Scott, 2012). 
The research literature suggests that attitudes towards climate change vary (see, for example, 
Corner et al., 2011; Kellstedt et al., 2008). Men, for example, are less likely than women to see 
climate change as a serious threat and are less likely to change their behaviour to protect the 
environment (Tranter, 2012). More educated citizens are more likely than others to believe in 
the existence of accelerating anthropogenic climate change and many of them are more 
motivated than others to change their behaviour for the sake of the environment (Whitmarsh, 
2011). Such changes are inserted in much wider choice sets, however. Schwanen and Lucas 
(2011), for example, in a wide-ranging review of automobile use, LQGLFDWH WKDW SHRSOH¶V
decisions regarding which transport mode to use for a particular trip will reflect not only their 
individual characteristics (such as age, sex, income, and education) but also the choice set 
available to them and the nature of the proposed trip. Whether people are prepared to vary their 
WUDYHO EHKDYLRXU LV WKXV WKH RXWFRPH RI ZKDW WKH\ WHUP µFRPSOH[ G\QDPLF DQG reciprocal 
LQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQµSHUVRQDO¶ IDFWRUVDQGµH[WHUQDO¶FLUFXPVWDQFHVVRPHRIZKLFKFDQEH
LQIOXHQFHGE\SXEOLFSROLFLHV¶6FKZDQQHQDQG/XFDV Thus although some groups 
within society might be both more likely to accept the arguments regarding climate change and 
the impact of CO2 emissions from various transport modes on its extent, not all of them ± 
because of a variety of factors and circumstances ± might be willing to alter their own transport 
behaviour substantially. 
There is a tendency for some public opinion research on climate change to be interpreted 
somewhat simplistically, without due consideration of the role of values (Nisbet, 2013). Public 
opinion should be understood as the outcome of processes that emerge from social contexts 
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DQGLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKDIIHFWLYHµVFKHPD¶PHQWDORUJDQL]HUVDQGFRJQLWLYHµYDOXHV¶WKDWVKDSH
judgements and personal behaviour. Values, as socialized predispositions, provide guidance on 
making sense of complex problems such as climate change and the proposed actions for dealing 
with the issue. A FRQVLGHUDEOHERG\RIUHVHDUFKH[SORUHVSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVto climate change 
and their links to travel behaviour. Those attitudes are generally identified through bespoke 
instruments GHVLJQHG WR PHDVXUH SHRSOH¶V µPRWLYDWLRQV SV\FKRORJLFDO PDNH-up or world 
YLHZV¶$QDEOHXVLQJDZLGH-ranging instrument, for example, Anable divided her 
respondents into six groups: malcontented motorists; complacent car addicts; die-hard drivers; 
aspiring environmentalists; car-less crusaders; and reluctant riders. These differed on a range 
of individual characteristics (gender, educational qualifications, income etc.) and in their levels 
of car use. Although pro-environmental beliefs are a necessary condition for individuals to 
consider changing their behaviour, however ± becoming car-less crusaders rather than die-hard 
drivers, for example ± they may not be sufficient because of a range of obstacles, barriers and 
impracticalities. Hence the need for public policies not only to advance education and 
understanding regarding climate change but also to µnudge¶ behaviour in a pro-environmental 
direction (see also Martinsson and Lundqvist, 2010). 
Other researchers have similarly used a variety of questionnaire-based instruments to measure 
environmental values and shown how these are related to preferences, intentions and behaviour 
(van der Werff, Steg and Keizer, 2013; de Groot and Steg, 2008, 2010), within a wider 
theoretical framework (Steg et al., 2014). Although some of those studies of environmental 
values have been set within wider contexts ± such as what Steg et al. (2012) term hedonic, 
egoistic and altruistic values ± these have not gone on to explore the links between more general 
socio-political values, environmental understanding and preparedness to modify behaviour. 
(For an extensive review covering beliefs about climate change and transport behaviour, see 
Anable et al., 2006.) In this paper, therefore, we examine attitudes towards anthropogenic 
climate change in the British population and the propensity for individual behavioural changes 
according not only to socio-demographic characteristics such as age (on which see Line et al., 
2010), gender, and educational attainment, but also from the perspective of political beliefs or 
core values for which a standard set of scales has been developed and widely used in UK social 
science (Evans et al., 1996). It is our proposition that political values may help to account for 
variations in views about climate change, pro-environment behaviour, and the policy changes 
needed to mitigate and adapt to climate change in important but complex ways; we test for that 
XVLQJDODUJHVXUYH\GDWDVHWZKLFKH[SORUHG%ULWLVKSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQG
possible changes in their transport behaviour to mitigate its effects 
Data and analysis 
The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey series has been conducted since 1983 with over 
3,000 interviews annually. Participants are selected using random probability sampling to 
ensure that the findings are representative of the British population. Over three decades, BSA 
has covered an extensive range of issues, and the 2011 survey included a module on beliefs 
about climate change and transport. (Some descriptive analyses of these data ± but without any 
coverage of issues relating to general attitudes ± are in Humphrey and Scott, 2012; see also 
Taylor, 2011.) 
 
Transport use and attitudes to behavioural change 
The initial questions asked respondents about their beliefs regarding climate change, their 
understanding of its causes, and the level of their concern regarding the impact of transport use 
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on its generation. On their answers to the first question, respondents were divided into those 
who believed in climate change, those who believed that it was happening, but without any 
human contribution, and those who did not believe in it.  (The question asked which of three 
VWDWHPHQWVFDPHFORVHVWWRWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VYLHZVµ,GRQ¶WEHOLHYHWKDWFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVWDNLQJ
SODFH¶µ,EHOLHYHWKDWFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVWDNLQJSODFHEXWQRWDVDUHVXOWRIKXPDQDFWLRQV¶DQG
,EHOLHYHWKDWFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVWDNLQJSODFHDQGLVDWOHDVWSDUWO\DUHVXOWRIKXPDQDFWLRQ¶
That classification is the basis for the analyses reported here; Table 1 shows that the great 
majority of respondents (77 per cent) believed that climate change is happening, with human 
contributions; only 7 per cent were climate change deniers, and the remaining 16 per cent 
believed only in non-anthropogenically-induced climate change. Does that quarter of the 
population who are, at best, sceptical about anthropogenically-induced climate change differ 
significantly from the majority group ± and in what ways? 
 
5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHDOVRDVNHGµZKDWW\SHVRIWKLQJVGR\RXWKLQNFRQWULEXWHWRFOLPDWHFKDQJH"¶
(a maximum of ten was recorded) and the items they identified were classified by the 
interviewers (with no prompting) into the following main categories: 
x Deforestation; 
x Emissions from road transport; 
x Emissions from planes; 
x Other emissions (factories, power stations etc.); 
x Aerosols and CFCs; 
x Use of gas and electricity; and 
x Methane production. 
Table 1 shows the percentage in each of the believer/disbeliever categories who identified each 
of the causes as contributing to climate change. Not surprisingly, there was a major difference 
in those percentages across the rows, but some dis-believers nevertheless agreed that the 
activities, particularly road transport emissions, were contributors. Even among the believers, 
however, a substantial proportion did not recognise the influence of all of the human-induced 
contributors. The major identified cause was emissions from road transport, but that percentage 
was below 70. 
 
$ IXUWKHU TXHVWLRQ DVNHG UHVSRQGHQWV KRZ FRQFHUQHG WKH\ ZHUH UHJDUGLQJ WUDQVSRUW¶V
contribution to climate change (the question asked how concerned they were, with four options: 
very concerned; fairly concerned; not very concerned; and not at all concerned). Again, 
believers ± defined by their response to the first question ± were much more likely to be 
concerned than non-believers; 74.5 per cent were either very or fairly concerned, compared to 
26.3 per cent of non-believers (Table 2) ± with the latter figure somewhat surprising since the 
beliefs and concerns are, on the surface, contradictory. Similarly, 42.1 per cent of those who 
believed in climate change but denied human involvement in its generation nevertheless stated 
WKDWWKH\ZHUHYHU\RUIDLUO\FRQFHUQHGDERXWURDGWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFW 
 
+DYLQJ LGHQWLILHG UHVSRQGHQWV¶ EHOLHIV DERXW FOLPDWH FKDQJH IXUWKHU suites of questions 
explored their positions towards changing travel behaviour in order to combat climate change. 
The first four tapped general attitudes to air transport, asking whether respondents agreed or 
disagreed with the following statements: 
x People should be able to travel by plane as much as they like; 
x People should travel by plane as much as they like, even if new runways are needed; 
x People should travel by plane as much as they like, even if it harms the environment; 
x The price of a plane ticket should reflect the environmental damage caused; 
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7DEOHWDEXODWHVWKRVHUHVSRQVHVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLUGHJUHHRIFRQFHUQDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFW
The general pattern is as expected: those most concerned were least likely to express laissez 
faire attitudes: 21.7 per cent of the very concerned disagreed with the statement that there 
should be no limits on air transport, for example, as against only 4.3 per cent of those who were 
not at all concerned. There was less support for complete freedom of use if either it involved 
building more runways or created environmental damage, but there were still substantial 
differences, as there were in responses to the final statement ± whether ticket prices should 
reflect environmental damage: the unconcerned were much less likely to approve a user-pays 
principle than the concerned. 
 
The second suite of general attitude questions comprised five statements asking for agreement 
or disagreement regarding car use: 
x People should be allowed to use their cars as much as they like, even at a cost to the 
environment; 
x People who drive cars that are better for the environment should pay less to use roads; 
x For the sake of the environment, car users should pay higher taxes; 
x For the environment everyone should reduce how much they use cars; and 
x There is no point reducing my car use to help the environment unless others do. 
Table 4 shows the same pattern of responses as the previous table. The first statement ± a 
complete laissez faire policy regarding car use ± gained support from only 14.7 per cent of the 
very concerned respondents compared with 55.2 per cent of the not at all concerned, for 
example, and 75.2 per cent of the former group agreed that there should be limits on car use 
compared to 25.4 per cent of the latter. But even among the very concerned there was a large 
number of free riders, who believed there would be no point in them reducing their own car 
XVDJHLIRWKHUVGLGQ¶WWRRDQLPSOLFLWVWDWHPHQWWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHOHJDOOLPLWVRQFDUXVH
fully 43.0 per cent of them agreed with that statement. 
 
The last suites of questions related to how individuals would respond themselves, separate from 
their general positions to transport-use constraints. Table 5 shows the responses to questions 
on how many short car journeys (of less than two miles) respondents made each week. 
:KDWHYHUWKHLUFRQFHUQDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQWKHHQYLURQPHQWQHYHUWKHOHVVDVXEVWDQWLDO
SHUFHQWDJHPDGHVHYHUDOVXFKWULSVHDFKZHHNWKRVHUHVSRQGLQJµQHYHU¶ZHUHWKRVHZKRQHYHU
travel by car). The potential for reducing car use for short journeys alone was thus substantial.  
 
And were respondents prepared to do that? Table 6 shows the percentages responding 
positively to four possible travel behaviour changes: 
x I am willing to reduce the amount I travel by car to help reduce the impact of climate 
change; 
x I am willing to reduce the amount I travel by plane to help reduce the impact of 
climate change; 
x I am prepared to reduce my speed on the motorway to help reduce my CO2 
emissions; 
x Next time I buy a car I would be willing to buy a car with lower CO2 emissions. 
As expected, there were major differences across the four groups according to their degree of 
FRQFHUQ DERXW WUDQVSRUW¶V LPSDFWRQFOLPDWH FKDQJH ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKHUH ZDVRQHRWKHU FOHDU
difference: respondents, whatever their degree of concern, were much more prepared to modify 
their travel behaviour (reducing motorway speeds; buying more environmentally-friendly cars) 
than they were to restrict it ± only just under two-thirds of the very concerned were prepared 
to reduce their use of air transport, for example, a finding in line with previous, qualitative, 
research (Hares et al., 2010). 
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The correlates of attitudes and behaviour 
 
The earlier discussion, following a wide literature on the subject, has suggested variations 
across the population in environmental concerns ± with particular reference to age, sex, 
ethnicity and educational qualifications. Table 7 explores the extent of such variations with 
regard to the two key variables analysed here ± beliefs in climate change and concerns about 
WUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQLW± holding the relationships with the four socio-demographic variables 
constant. (Other variations ± by marital status, religion, the presence of children in the 
household, housing tenure, income, occupation, and employment status ± were explored and 
found to be insubstantial: there were relationships with employment status but as this was 
collinear with age ± older people were more likely to be economically inactive ± it was not 
included as a separate variable.1) By age, the main difference is between the very old (75<) and 
the rest of the population; old people were more likely to be climate change deniers and less 
OLNHO\ WR EH FRQFHUQHG DERXW WUDQVSRUW¶V LPSDFWV 7KHUH ZDV YHU\ OLWWOH GLIIHrence between 
males and females in their beliefs regarding climate change, but females were somewhat more 
OLNHO\WREHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWVRZHUHEODFNDQGRWKHUPLQRULW\HWKQLF%0(
respondents compared to the white majority. The main differences, as anticipated, reflected 
educational qualifications: those with none were more than seven times as likely to be climate 
change deniers as those with degrees for example, and four times as likely to be not at all 
FRQFHUQHGDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDcts on the environment. 
 
,WKDVDOVREHHQDUJXHGWKDWSHRSOH¶VJHQHUDOSROLWLFDOVRFLDOHFRQRPLFDQGFXOWXUDOYDOXHVDUH
related to their positions on climate change; those with right-wing and authoritarian values 
would be less likely to favour constraints on individual behaviour than those with more left-
wing and/or libertarian views. The BSA survey contained two widely-used sets of Likert-scale 
attitudinal questions that tapped these value systems (Evans et al., 1996). The first five asked 
for levels of agreement with statements which tap attitudes that are generally associated with a 
left-right spectrum of beliefs (those with left-wing attitudes were assumed to agree with the 
statements): 
x Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well 
off; 
x Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers; 
x 2UGLQDU\ZRUNLQJSHRSOHGRQRWJHWWKHLUIDLUVKDUHRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VZHDOWK 
x There is one law for the rich and one for the poor; and 
x Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance. 
The second set comprised six statements generally associated with variations in values along a 
libertarian-authoritarian spectrum (those with authoritarian attitudes were assumed to agree 
with the statements): 
x YouQJSHRSOHWRGD\GRQ¶WKDYHHQRXJKUHVSHFWIRUWUDGLWLRQDO%ULWLVKYDOXHV 
x People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences; 
x For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence; 
x Schools should teach children to obey authority; 
x The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong; 
x Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. 
For each of these sets we conducted a principal components analysis. In both cases, a single 
component dominated, as shown by the loadings in Table 8, and a score on each was derived 
for all respondents. (The responses to some of the statements were recoded so that all were 
consistent with the assumed scale.) A high positive score on the first component identifies 
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somebody with relatively left-wing views; a similar score on the second identifies individuals 
who are more libertarian than authoritarian in their value systems. 
 
7DEOHVKRZVQRVXEVWDQWLDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQUHVSRQGHQWV¶OHIW-right values and whether 
they believed in climate change, but a considerable difference in whether they were concerned 
DERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQDYHUDJHWKRVHZKRZHUHYHU\FRQFHUQHGDERXWWKDWLPSDFWZHUH
more left-wing than those who were not very concerned. There were, on the other hand, clearer 
differences between respondents according to their positions on the second values scale. 
Libertarians were more likely to be climate-change believers and authoritarians to be non-
EHOLHYHUVIRUH[DPSOHWKRVHYHU\FRQFHUQHGDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶s impact were also on average at 
the libertarian end of the scale whereas those not at all concerned were concentrated towards 
the authoritarian pole. 
 
Multivariate analyses 
 
To evaluate the relative importance of the various potential influences on climate change 
beliefs and transport behaviour, a series of multivariate analyses has been run. After 
exploration, six independent variables are included: age, sex, educational qualifications, and 
ethnicity plus the left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scales ± others, such as religion and 
social class, were excluded after preliminary analyses showed no significant relationships. In 
addition, given the expected strong relationship with qualifications, we also tested for 
variations among degree-holders according to their values on the two scales using interaction 
variables, and these are included in the reports where they were significant; the expectation 
was that graduates with more right-wing and authoritarian views would be less prepared to 
change their behaviour than their more left-wing and libertarian graduate counterparts.  
 
Beliefs and understanding 
 
The first regression analysed variations in beliefs about climate change. A multinomial logistic 
analysis contrasted believers with the other two groups. As anticipated, younger groups were 
less likely to be either non-believers or non-believers in anthropogenic climate change than 
members of the oldest generation, although the significant regression coefficients and their 
related exponents show no steady decrease in climate change believers with age (Table 10); 
indeed, the most likely non-believers were those aged 55-64 and, perhaps surprisingly, there 
was no significant difference between the oldest two and the youngest age groups. (Using 
conventional tests of statistical significance, there are no significant differences between any 
pair of age groups; the only firm conclusion to be drawn from table 10 is that all age groups 
aged under 75 were significantly less likely to be non-believers than those aged over 74.)  By 
far the biggest difference revealed is between those with no educational qualifications and those 
with degrees: the former are nearly six times more likely to be non-believers than the latter (as 
shown by the exponent of 0.18), and even those with sub-degree qualifications are only half as 
likely to be climate change deniers as those without qualifications. Degree-holders were also 
less likely than those without qualifications to believe in non-anthropogenic climate change 
only. 
 
There were no significant differences in climate change beliefs by either sex or ethnicity, but 
there were according to position on the libertarian-authoritarian values scale: those towards the 
libertarian end of that scale were more likely to believe in human-induced climate change and 
those of a more authoritarian disposition more likely to be sceptical about its existence. Further 
analyses identified no significant links with the two interaction variables: libertarians with 
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degrees were no more likely to believe in climate change than those without; those with strong 
authoritarian attitudes were no more likely to be non-believers. 
 
Regarding knowledge about the causes of anthropogenic climate change, Table 11 reports 
analyses of a composite variable relating to the number of positive responses to the seven 
suggested sources listed in Table 1: the higher the number the greater the range of recognised 
sources. Of the 3,309 respondents for whom complete data were available, 665 said none of 
the seven was a source of climate change, whereas only 57 said all seven were. For the analysis, 
respondents were reduced to three groups: those who identified no sources (no awareness); 
those identifying 1-3 sources (some awareness); and those identifying four or more sources 
(high awareness). 
 
Two clear conclusions emerge from this analysis (Table 11): younger people and those with 
higher qualifications are aware of a greater number of sources of climate change than are both 
their older contemporaries and those with no qualifications ± though, given those differences, 
females are more likely than males to be aware of a wide range of sources. In addition, those 
with more libertarian attitudes are on average better-informed than those whose views are 
closer to the authoritarian pole, especially ± as shown by the interaction coefficients ± 
libertarians with degrees. 
 
Concerns about transport and climate change 
 
The next set of multinomial logistic regressions contrasts those who were not at all concerned 
about the impact of transport on climate change with those who were not very, fairly, or very 
concerned (Table 12). Again, the clearest differences were across educational qualifications; 
compared to the unqualified, those with some qualifications and, especially, those with degrees 
were much more likely to be concerned (nearly four times as likely in the case of those who 
were very concerned). Again, too, males were both significantly and substantially less likely 
to be concerned than females (the latter were twice as likely to be very concerned ± an exponent 
of 0.52), and older adults were more likely to be concerned than the aged although younger 
adults were no more likely than those over 74 to be very concerned. (There are substantial 
exponents exceeding 1.0 for the three youngest age groups, but they are not statistically 
significant, probably indicative of a collinearity effect because ± compared to their older peers 
± young people are more likely to have degrees: 31.5 per cent of those aged 25-44 in the BSA 
sample did, compared to 21.8 per cent of those aged 45-54 and 11.8 per cent of 65-74 year-
olds.) Finally, those on the left are more likely to be concerned than respondents with more 
right-wing attitudes and, as the significant interaction coefficients suggest, libertarians with 
degrees are more likely to be concerned than those without. 
 
Changing behaviour 
 
Respondents who returned the post-back part of the BSA questionnaire were asked their 
positions regarding various policies that would constrain plane and transport use. Their answers 
were recoded so that agreement meant that the respondents adopted the more environmentally-
friendly option (e.g. they were opposed to no constraints on plane travel: Table 3). Of the 951 
respondents, 361 had a complete laissez-faire attitude across all four issues, 249 agreed with 
just one, 167 with two, 11 with three and 65 with all four. For analysis, these were reduced to 
three groups: those who favoured none of the proposals, 1-2 and 3-4 ± with the latter group the 
most environmentally-friendly. 
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Because of the relatively small number of observations, a stepwise regression approach was 
deployed, and variables with no significant link to the dependent variable excluded. Table 13 
shows five clear differences, notably when comparing those who were completely laissez-faire 
on policy regarding air transport (i.e. gave zero positive answers; the comparator group) with 
those most in favour of constraints (giving 3-4 positive answers). Those with degrees were 
twice as likely to favour constraints as those wiWKRXWWKRVHYHU\FRQFHUQHGDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶V
impact on the environment were 4.6 times more likely to be in favour of extensive constraints 
as those with lesser concern; males were less prepared to have constraints on air transport than 
females; those with left-wing political attitudes and those with libertarian attitudes were also 
more likely to favour constraints than were those with right-wing and authoritarian attitudes 
respectively. There were no significant differences across age groups or between ethnic groups. 
 
Regarding constraints on car use, respondents were asked their opinions on five possibilities 
(Table 4): these were coded so that a positive answer was environmentally-friendly. Of the 951 
respondents, just 51 gave a positive answer for none of them, with 222, 250, 256, 146 and 26 
for 1-5 environmentally-friendly answers respectively. For the analysis, these were compressed 
into three groups: 0-1 positive answers, 2-3 and 4-5. 
 
The regression results (Table 14) contain even fewer significant relationships than the previous 
set with, in particular, no significant differences by either age or qualifications according to the 
degree to which respondents thought car use should be curbed. (The qualifications variable was 
retained in later models to allow the exploration of interaction effects.) Apart from the very 
ODUJH GLIIHUHQFHV DFFRUGLQJ WR GHJUHH RI FRQFHUQ UHJDUGLQJ WUDQVSRUW¶V LPSDFW RQ WKH
environment, the other significant relationships were with the value scales, with those on the 
left-wing and libertarians being more likely to prefer constraints on car use than those on the 
right and authoritarians: males were more likely to favour constraints on car use than females. 
 
Finally, respondents were asked to what extent they were prepared to modify their own travel 
behaviour, in four ways (Table 5). Of the 918 respondents for whom data were available, 102 
were not prepared to change in any way, 125 agreed to make one change and 196 to two; 179 
agreed to three of the changes, and 316 to all four. For the regression analysis, these have been 
reduced to three categories: zero positive answers, 1-2, and 3-4 (Table 15). Females were much 
more likely to be prepared to change their behaviour than males ± the exponent of 0.30 for 
agreeing to three or four of the proposed changes shows them more than three times as likely 
to be prepared to make broad changes; there were again no differences by age group. Those 
with degrees were some 2.7 times more likely to be prepared to make changes than those with 
lower or no qualifications. Values were also important: both left-wingers and libertarians were 
more likely to be prepared to make major changes. 
 
Political identification, climate change beliefs and transport behaviour 
 
The great majority of the respondents to the BSA 2011 survey not only believed in climate 
change, therefore, but believed that it was human-induced and were sufficiently concerned 
about transport use as a cause of that change to be prepared to modify their behaviour, to some 
degree. Were those beliefs and concerns also linked to their political positions, in particular 
which party they identified with? The respondents were asked ± two years after the general 
election in which the Conservative party leader, who became Prime Minister in a coalition with 
WKH/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWV LQSURPLVHGWKHµJUHHQHVWJRYHUQPHQW\HW¶ ± which party they 
identified with. Of those who named a party, 1,039 identified with Labour, 926 with the 
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Conservatives and 253 the Liberal Democrats; a further 208 identified with one of six minor 
parties and the remainder either gave no identification or declined to answer. 
 
A multinomial logistic regression analysis contrasted the characteristics of Labour and Liberal 
Democrat with Conservative identifiers using a typical range of independent variables for such 
analyses: the other parties were excluded because of their small number of identifiers. This 
successfully accounted for some 35 per cent of the variation. A second model was then run 
adding the climate change belief and conceUQ DERXW WUDQVSRUW¶V LPSDFW YDULDEOHV ZKLFK
increased the R2 value to 0.39. The results of that latter model are in Table 16. Consistent with 
other research, this shows clear distinctions between Labour and Conservative identifiers on a 
number of criteria (age, ethnicity, housing tenure, occupational class, and trade union 
membership) but not between Liberal Democrat and Conservative identifiers (only sex and 
occupational class were statistically significant). In addition, however, both Labour and Liberal 
Democrat identifiers were more likely than those who identify with the Conservative party to 
have left-wing and libertarian values. Furthermore, they were also much more likely to believe 
in anthropogenically-induced climate change: Conservative identifiers were almost twice as 
likely as Labour identifiers to be either non-believers or to believe that climate change was 
happening but was not human-induced, and they were also some six times less likely to believe 
in climate change than Liberal Democrat identifiers (an exponent of 0.17). Climate change 
believers therefore identified with the parties of the centre-left rather than that of the right, 
whose leader had backed away from some of his earlier commitments,2 but there was no 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWKUHHSDUWLHV¶VXSSRUWHUVLQWKHH[WHQW WRZKLFKWKH\ZHUHFRQFHUQHG
DERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJH 
 
Alongside the very substantial differences in UHVSRQGHQWV¶beliefs regarding climate change and 
attitudes towards its amelioration according to educational qualifications ± graduates are by far 
the most concerned about climate change and the most willing to change their behaviour to 
combat it ± there are therefore also clear differences according to political ideology. The British 
electorate is clearly divided on two attitudinal dimensions ± widely presented as left-right and 
libertarian-authoritarian ± and those divisions are reflected not only in how people vote and 
respond to political initiatives generally but also, in particular, to what many, including 
government chief scientists, identify as one of the centuries most pressing issues ± 
anthropogenically-induced climate change. Whilst in general it is the young and the more 
educated who have the greatest concerns regarding that change and are more willing to modify 
their travel behaviour, those relationships are modified according to their political value 
systems; among the more educated, those with more right-wing and authoritarian political 
values are less likely to believe in, and be prepared to respond to, climate change than those 
whose political values are of the left and libertarian. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The results reported here complement and substantially extend other British work on 
environmental beliefs and transport behaviour. The majority of adults ± especially the young 
and those with the highest educational qualifications ± believe that climate change is occurring 
and most of them associate that change with human action. Despite that situation, however, 
many of the believers appear reluctant to modify their behaviour substantially. Policies 
designed to alter transport habits and induce behaviour change (e.g. Schwanen et al., 2012) 
need to take that clear conclusion into account: as yet, even those climate-change believers 
PRVW FRQFHUQHG DERXW WUDQVSRUW¶V FRQWULEXWLRQV DUH IDU IURP IXlly prepared to make major 
changes to their own behaviour in order to ensure a sustainable environmental future. 
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Moving towards that situation will not be straightforward, however, because the findings here 
are in some sense contradictory. With the expansion of higher education and generational 
replacement, a larger proportion of the population should both recognise the existence of 
human-induced climate change and be prepared to modify their behaviour in order to reduce 
its impact. But their attitudes towards climate change are likely to be influenced by the media 
and politicians ± PHGLDSRUWUD\DOVFDQKDYHµIDU-reacKLQJFRQVHTXHQFHV¶LQKRZWKHVFLHQWLILF
issues are portrayed (Boykoff and Smith, 2010, 216), and in turn politicians tend to follow 
public opinion as crystallised by the media (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). But, as Painter (2011, 
135ff.) argues, the media in western countries are increasingly right-wing in their attitudes ± 
sceptical about climate change, unable (unwilling?) to transmit the complex scientific 
arguments regarding risk and uncertainty (in part by the reduction in the number of specialist 
science reporters), and so unlikely to promote public understanding of, engagement with and 
willingness to change behaviour in the light of climate change. Thus the relatively optimistic 
view presented in the analyses here of attitudes to climate change and behavioural adaptation 
among the young and the better-educated and those who have both left-wing and libertarian 
attitudes have to be set against the more pessimistic interpretations of the findings regarding 
those with more right-wing and authoritarian attitudes. If ± as analyses of the media and 
politicians seeking to win and maintain power suggest ± those sceptical attitudes become more 
prevalent within the population, then, DV :KLWPDUVK¶V ; see also Corner et al., 2012) 
surveys indicated, substantial change that will significantly mitigate the processes and impact 
of climate change appears less likely. Without a strong, informed lead people, and especially 
adolescents (Stevenson et al., 2014), are unlikely to make climate change and its mitigation a 
high priority personal or political issue (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). 
 
Notes 
1 7KH%6$TXHVWLRQQDLUHDOVRREWDLQHGLQIRUPDWLRQRQUHVSRQGHQWV¶WUDYHOSDWWHUQVDQGFRQFHUQVDERXWDQXPEHU
of other environmental issues ± such as the impact on emissions from vehicles ± but their incorporation made no 
significant contributions to the exploratory analyses undertaken before the final set reported here, 
2 'DYLG&DPHURQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWROHDGWKHµJUHHQHVWJRYHUQPHQWHYHU¶VHHhttp://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2010/may/14/cameron-wants-greenest-government-ever) came increasingly under attack from 
members of his own party over the next four years, however, many of whom opposed subsidies to renewable 
energy projects during a period of austerity in public spending and their impact on energy prices ± so much so 
WKDWLQODWHKHZDVTXRWHGDVFDOOLQJIRUDµUHPRYDORIDOOWKDWJUHHQFUDS¶LQRUGHUWREULQJELOOVGRZQDQG
gain popular VXSSRUWLQWKHIDFHRIWKH/DERXUOHDGHU¶VSOHGJHWRIUHH]HHQHUJ\ELOOVIRUWZR\HDUVDIWHUWKH
general election (see http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/21/david-cameron-green-crap-
comments-storm and http://action.labour.org.uk/page/s/energy-calculator). 
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Table 1. Beliefs about climate change and its sources (per cent of column totals) 
 
 Climate Change Belief 
Source NB BNH B   
Deforestation 4.5 10.1 29.1 
Road transport 14.9 31.3 69.3 
Air transport 6.8 20.2 46.1 
Other emissions 11.2 29.7 60.6 
Aerosols/CFCs 4.0 5.4 12.7 
Gas/electricity 1.8 6.2 18.1 
Methane 3.1 8.5 20.3 
N 223 516 2,521 
 
Key: NB ± non-believers; BNH ± believers that there is climate change but without human 
involvement; B ± believers that there is human-induced climate change. 
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Table 2. Beliefs about climate change and the impact of transport (per cent of column totals) 
 
 Climate Change Belief 
Source NB BNH B   
Very 6.8 9.7 23.2 
Fairly 19.5 32.4 51.3 
Not very 38.0 41.1 21.3 
Not at all 35.7 16.8 4.2 
N 223 513 2,500 
 
Key: NB ± non-believers; BNH ± believers that there is climate change but without human 
involvement; B ± believers that there is human-induced climate change. 
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7DEOH'HJUHHRIFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGDWWLWXGHVWR
travel behaviour (percentages of column totals: the percentages in each block do not sum to 
100 because of those who expressed no opinion) 
  Degree of Concern 
  V F NV NAA 
Travel by plane as much as they like  
 Agree strongly 10.3 10.3 16.6 20.6 
 Agree 41.4 48.1 54.7 55.9 
 Neither agree/disagree 22.7 25.5 18.3 13.2 
 Disagree 21.2 8.9 4.0 2.9 
 Disagree strongly 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.4 
Travel by plane as much as they like even if new runways needed 
 Agree strongly 3.9 6.3 5.2 15.2 
 Agree 22.0 25.6 41.4 50.0 
 Neither agree/disagree 25.4 31.2 28.1 10.6 
 Disagree 34.6 25.2 15.7 16.7 
 Disagree strongly 8.3 4.0 2.0 1.5 
Travel by plane as much as they like even if harms environment 
 Agree strongly 1.0 3.5 2.4 11.9 
 Agree 6.3 13.3 21.0 23.9 
 Neither agree/disagree 24.9 28.1 42.3 25.4 
 Disagree 42.9 38.4 24.6 22.4 
 Disagree strongly 20.0 8.6 2.4 6.0 
Ticket price should reflect damage 
 Agree strongly 17.7 4.9 4.9 7.6 
 Agree 35.5 32.9 32.4 25.8 
 Neither agree/disagree 17.2 30.6 22.7 18.2 
 Disagree 19.7 18.9 26.7 28.5 
 Disagree strongly 4.4 4.9 6.5 13.6 
N  203 428 247 66 
 
Key to degree of concern: V ± Very; F ± Fairly; NV ± Not Very; NAA ± Not At All. 
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7DEOH'HJUHHRIFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGDWWLWXGHVWR
travel behaviour (percentages of column totals: the percentages in each block do not sum to 
100 because of those who expressed no opinion) 
  Degree of Concern 
  V F NV NAA 
People should use cars as much as they like 
 Agree strongly 3.4 2.6 3.2 16.4 
 Agree 11.3 19.3 36.9 38.8 
 Neither agree/disagree 22.5 38.0 38.2 19.4 
 Disagree 41.2 29.8 15.7 17.9 
 Disagree strongly 17.2 4.0 0.8 1.5 
People with environmentally-friendly cars should pay less for road use 
 Agree strongly 5.4 1.9 0.i8 0.0 
 Agree 23.2 10.0 3.2 4.5 
 Neither agree/disagree 16.7 21.2 16.2 25.4 
 Disagree 42.9 45.5 50.6 44.8 
 Disagree strongly 10.3 15.9 23.1 20.9 
Differential road charges 
 Agree strongly 22.5 14.5 8.0 7.5 
 Agree 46.1 46.0 43.0 34.3 
 Neither agree/disagree 16.2 21.7 22.5 28.4 
 Disagree 8.8 10.3 16.1 14.9 
 Disagree strongly 2.0 2.1 2.0 7.5 
All should reduce car use 
 Agree strongly 21.5 7.2 5.2 1.5 
 Agree 53.7 52.3 32.7 23.9 
 Neither agree/disagree 13.7 24.2 33.5 26.9 
 Disagree 5.4 9.8 19.8 34.3 
 Disagree strongly 2.4 0.9 2.0 9.0 
Free rider on car use 
 Agree strongly 12.2 6.0 15.3 6.0 
 Agree 31.7 37.2 40.7 34.3 
 Neither agree/disagree 9.3 24.2 22.2 32.8 
 Disagree 26.8 21.4 12.5 9.0 
 Disagree strongly 15.1 2.8 1.6 3.0 
N  205 430 248 67 
 
Key to degree of concern: V ± Very; F ± Fairly; NV ± Not Very; NAA ± Not At All. 
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Table 5. Degree of concern regDUGLQJWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGFXUUHQWURDG
use (percentages of column totals: the percentages in each block do not sum to 100 because 
of those who expressed no opinion) 
  Degree of Concern 
  V F NV NAA 
Number of short car journeys per week 
 0 19.4 17.8 18.0 23.1 
 1-2 28.3 23.0 22.7 21.7 
 3-5 15.6 23.7 18.6 6.3 
 6-10 7.0 12.9 15.4 9.1 
 11+ 4.9 4.4 11.2 8.4 
Never 18.9 13.0 9.4 21.0 
 N 371 870 501 143 
  
Key to degree of concern: V ± Very; F ± Fairly; NV ± Not Very; NAA ± Not At All. 
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Table 'HJUHHRIFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGZLOOLQJQHVVWR
change travel behaviour (percentages of column totals: the percentages in each block do not 
sum to 100 because of those who expressed no opinion) 
  Degree of Concern 
  V F NV NAA 
Reduce amount of car travel 79.8 58.2 36.1 22.8 
Reduce the amount of plane travel 64.7 52.0 27.0 16.7 
Prepared to reduce motorway speed 93.4 78.9 55.6 24.4 
Buy a car with lower CO2 emissions 97.8 90.5 73.8 47.4 
N  183 402 252 78 
 
Key to degree of concern: V ± Very; F ± Fairly; NV ± Not Very; NAA ± Not At All. 
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Table 7. Age, sex, ethnicity, educational qualifications and climate change attitudes 
(percentage of row totals) 
  Climate Change Beliefs &RQFHUQDERXW7UDQVSRUW¶V,PSDFW 
  NB BNH B V F NV NAA 
Age group 
 15-24 7 18 75 22 41 29 9 
 25-44 5 12 83 20 50 23 7 
 45-54 6 16 78 18 47 25 10 
 55-64 6 16 78 20 46 27 7 
 65-74 7 21 72 22 43 26 9 
 75< 16 21 63 17 35 31 17 
Sex 
 Male 7 17 76 19 42 29 10 
 Female 7 15 79 21 49 23 7 
Ethnicity 
 White 7 16 77 18 47 26 9 
 BME 5 16 79 33 40 21 6 
Educational qualifications 
 Degree 2 11 87 24 48 24 4 
 Sub-degree 5 16 79 19 48 25 8 
 None 15 19 66 17 40 28 16 
 
Keys: Climate Change Beliefs: NB ± Non-Believer; BNH ± Believer but No Human 
Contribution; B ± Believer: Degree of Concern: V ± Very; F ± Fairly; NV ± Not Very; NAA 
± Not At All. 
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Table 8. Loadings on the principal components 
 
  Left-Right Libertarian-Authoritarian 
Redistribute income 0.73 Young disrespect 0.79 
Owners benefit 0.81 Stiffer sentences 0.84 
Fair shares of wealth 0.86 Death penalty 0.72 
One law for the rich 0.85 Authority at schools 0.84 
Management wins 0.83 Law always obeyed 0.71 
  Censorship necessary 0.72 
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Table 9. Mean values on the two attitudinal components and climate change attitudes. 
 
  Climate Change Beliefs &RQFHUQDERXW7UDQVSRUW¶V,PSDFW 
  NB BNH B V F NV NAA 
Left-right 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.19 0.01 0.15 0.04  
Libertn.-authoritn. -0.19 -0.20 0.10 0.15 0.05 -0.01 -0.14 
 
Keys: Climate Change Beliefs: NB ± Non-Believer; BNH ± Believer but No Human 
Contribution; B ± Believer: Degree of Concern: V ± Very; F ± Fairly; NV ± Not Very; NAA 
± Not At All. 
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Table 10. Multinomial logistic regression analysis of climate change beliefs (comparator: 
believer) 
 
  Believer but not Human Non-Believer 
  b SE Exp b SE Exp 
Constant -1.08 0.29  -0.94 0.37 
Age (comparator: 75+) 
15-24 -0.16 0.27 0.85 -0.33 0.35 0.72  
25-44 -0.64 0.24 0.53 -0.87 0.31 0.42 
45-54 -0.36 0.25 0.70 -0.62 0.32 0.54 
55-64 -0.49 0.25 0.62 -1.00 0.34 0.37 
65-74 -0.19 0.25 0.83 -0.72 0.33 0.49 
Sex (comparator: female) 
Male 0.11 0.12 0.80 0.15 0.17 0.40 
Ethnicity (comparator: BME) 
White -0.07 0.21 0.93 -0.34 0.29 0.72 
Educational qualifications (comparator: none) 
Below degree -0.22 0.17 0.81 -0.78 0.23 0.46 
Degree -0.51 0.21 0.60 -1.71 0.35 0.18 
Value scales 
Left-right 0.09 0.09 1.10 0.02 0.06 1.02 
Libertn.-authoritn. -0.30 0.06 0.74 -0.17 0.09 0.84 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.05level or better; those underlined are significant 
between 0.05-0.10. 
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Table 11. Multinomial logistic regression analysis of awareness of the impact of various 
causes of climate change (comparator: no awareness). 
 Some Awarness High Awareness 
  b SE Exp b SE Exp 
Constant 1.23 0.31  -1.24 0.44 
Age (comparator: 75+) 
15-24 0.85 0.26 2.34 1.10 0.40 3.00 
25-44 0.71 0.21 2.04 1.47 0.35 4.37 
45-54 0.33 0.22 1.39 0.91 0.36 2.45 
55-64 0.39 0.22 1.47 1.13 0.36 3.06 
65-74 -0.11 0.22 0.90 0.43 0.37 1.54 
Sex (comparator: female) 
Male 0.07 0.11 1.07 -0.32 0.14 0.73 
Ethnicity (comparator: BME) 
White -0.79 0.26 0.45 -0.36 0.31 0.70 
Educational qualifications (comparator: none) 
Below degree 0.38 0.15 1.46 0.73 0.22 2.04 
Degree 0.79 0.21 2.19 1.43 0.27 4.19 
Value scales 
Left-right -0.03 0.06 0.97 -0.01 0.08 0.99 
Libertn-authoritn. 0.04 0.07 1.04 0.17 0.08 1.19 
Interactions with degree 
Left-right -0.12 0.15 0.39 -0.40 -0.17 0.67 
Libertn-authoritn. 0.36 0.16 1.44 0.35 0.18 1.43 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.05level or better; those underlined are significant 
between 0.05-0.10. 
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Table 12. Multinomial ORJLVWLFUHJUHVVLRQDQDO\VLVRIGHJUHHRIFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWUDQVSRUW¶V
impact on climate change (comparator: not at all concerned) 
 
Degree of concern Not Very Fairly Very 
  b SE Exp b SE Exp b SE Exp 
Constant 0.58 0.41  0.72 0.40  1.07 0.42 
Age (comparator: 75+) 
15-24 0.59 0.37 1.80 0.60 0.36 1.82 0.50 0.39 1.64 
25-44 0.25 0.31 1.28 0.94 0.30 2.58 0.27 0.33 1.31 
45-54 0.26 0.33 1.30 0.78 0.32 2.19 0.18 0.35 1.20 
55-64 0.76 0.34 2.13 1.18 0.33 3.24 0.74 0.36 2.09 
65-74 0.59 0.34 1.81 0.97 0.33 2.64 0.79 0.36 2.20 
Sex (comparator: female) 
Male -0.14 0.17 0.87 -0.63 0.16 0.53 -0.65 0.18 0.52 
Ethnicity (comparator: BME) 
White -0.16 0.33 0.85 -0.10 0.32 0.91 -0.93 0.32 0.39 
Educational qualifications (comparator: none) 
Below degree 0.45 0.23 1.57 0.72 0.22 2.05 0.61 0.25 1.83 
Degree 0.94 0.32 2.55 1.13 0.31 3.84 1.35 0.33 3.84 
Value scales 
Left-right 0.18 0.10 1.08 -0.15 0.09 0.86 -0.25 0.10 0.78 
Libertn-authoritn. 0.03 0.10 1.03 0.04 0.09 1.13 0.13 0.10 1.14 
Interactions with degree 
Left-right 0.02 0.22 1.03 0.13 0.22 1.13 -0.13 0.23 0.88 
Libertn-authoritn. 0.31 0.25 1.37 0.60 0.24 1.82 0.58 0.25 1.78 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.05level or better; those underlined are significant 
between 0.05-0.10. 
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Table 13. Multinomial logistic regression of attitudes towards potential policies constraining 
plane transport (comparator: opposed to all constraints) 
 
   1-2   3-4 
  b SE Exp b SE Exp 
Constant -0.32 0.33  -1.11 0.47 
Sex (comparator: female) 
Male -0.12 0.16 0.89 -0.56 0.21 0.57 
Educational qualifications (comparator: none) 
Below degree 0.18 0.21 1.20 -0.01 0.27 0.99 
Degree 0.79 0.27 2.21 0.68 0.34 1.97 
&RQFHUQDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHFRPSDUDWRUQRWDWDOO 
Not very 0.04 0.32 1.04 -0.42 0.50 0.66 
Fairly 0.47 0.31 1.61 0.59 0.45 1.80 
Very 0.68 0.35 1.97 1.52 0.48 4.56 
Value scales 
Left-right -0.50 0.80 0.95 -0.21 0.11 0.81 
Libertn-authoritn. 0.78 0.84 1.08 0.22 0.11 1.24 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.05level or better; those underlined are significant 
between 0.05-0. 
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Table 14. Multinomial logistic regression of attitudes towards potential policies constraining 
car transport (comparator: opposed to most constraints) 
 
   2-3   4-5 
  b SE Exp b SE Exp 
Constant -0.35 0.31  -2.97 0.79 
Educational qualifications (comparator: none) 
Below degree -0.04 0.22 0.96 0.05 0.31 1.05 
Degree 0.44 0.30 1.55 0.50 0.41 1.65 
&RQFHUQDERXWWUDQVSRUW¶VLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHFRPSDUDWRUQRWDWDOO 
Not very 0.73 0.31 2.07 0.94 0.82 2.55 
Fairly 1.20 0.30 3.32 2.65 0.78 14.15 
Very 1.79 0.37 5.98 3.80 0.80 44.62 
Value scales 
Left-right -0.19 0.10 0.83 -0.25 0.13 0.78 
Libertn-authoritn. -0.04 0.10 0.96 -0.01 0.13 1.00 
Interactions with degree 
Left-right -0.07 0.21 0.91 -0.46 0.28 0.64 
Libertn-authoritn. 0.23 0.25 1.26 0.71 0.30 2.04 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.05level or better; those underlined are significant 
between 0.05-0.10. 
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Table 15. Multinomial logistic regression of willingness to constrain own transport use 
(comparator: opposed to all constraints) 
 
 
Number of changes  1-2   3-4 
  b SE Exp b SE Exp 
Constant 2.34 0.92  3.58 0.90 
Sex (comparator: female) 
Male -0.84 0.29 0.43 -1.19 0.28 0.30 
Ethnicity (comparator: BME) 
White -0.88 0.87 0.42 -1.71 0.18 0.18 
Educational qualifications (comparator: none) 
Below degree 0.02 0.39 1.02 0.39 0.38 1.48 
Degree 1.00 0.48 2.71 1.00 0.48 2.73 
Value scales 
Left-right -0.12 0.12 0.88 -0.54 0.12 0.58 
Libertn-authoritn. 0.23 0.14 1.26 0.37 0.14 1.45 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.05level or better; those underlined are significant 
between 0.05-0.10. 
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Table 16. Multinomial logistic regression of partisan preferences (comparator: Conservative) 
 Labour Liberal Democrat 
 b SE Exp b Se Exp 
Constant 2.70 0.46  -0.51 0.71 
Age (comparator: 74+) 
15-24 1.93 0.37 6.87 0.25 0.56 1.29 
25-44 1.02 0.29 2.76 0.68 0.41 1.96 
45-54 0.71 0.30 2.04 0.23 0.43 1.26 
55-64 0.34 0.29 1,40 0.07 0.42 1.08 
65-74 0.17 0.29 1.19 -0.17 0.43 0.84 
Sex (comparator: female) 
Male -0.14 0.13 0.87 -0.39 0.18 0.68 
Ethnicity (comparator: BME) 
White -1.74 0.27 0.18 -0.32 0.43 0.73 
Educational qualifications (comparator: none) 
Below degree -0.77 0.27 0.46 0.20 0.40 1,22 
Degree -0.85 0.22 0.43 0.01 0.34 1.01 
Housing tenure (comparator: rented) 
Owner-occupied -0.84 0.16 0.43 -0.30 0.23 0.73 
Occupational class (comparator: semi- and unskilled) 
Professional -0.71 0.19 0.49 -0.52 0.26 0.59  
Routine non-manual -0.68 0.19 0.51 -0.64 0.28 0.63 
Skilled -0.32 0.26 0.73 -0.49 0.40 0.61 
Trade Union (comparator: non-member) 
Member 0.76 0.17 2.15 0.30 0.23 1.34 
Value scales 
Left-right -0.77 0.07 0.46 -0.42 0.10 0.66 
Libertrn.-authoritrn. 0.66 0.08 1.93 0.86 0.10 2.37 
Beliefs in climate change (comparator: believer) 
Non-believer -0.62 0.31 0.54 -1.77 0.77 0.17 
Believer but non-anthropo. -0.55 0.19 0.58 -0.50 0.29 0.60 
Concern and transport impact on climate change (comparator: not at all) 
Very 0.15 0.30 0.63 0.45 0.46 1.56 
Fairly 0.25 0.28 0.37 0.24 0.43 1.27 
Not very 0.09 0.28 0.97 -0.23 0.45 0.80 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.05level or better; those underlined are significant 
between 0.05-0.10. 
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